Цитринович: убийството на Хаменей беше грешка.
https://x.com/citrinowicz/status/2110049112066269268The Killing of Khamenei: A Strategic Mistake We Are Still Paying For
As I have argued from the very beginning, the killing of Ali Khamenei was a grave strategic mistake. Not because Khamenei was a moderate leader, or because there were no legitimate reasons to confront the Iranian regime, but because the decision to eliminate him was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the regime, how decisions are made in Tehran, and the potential consequences of removing him from power.
1. Empowering the Hardliners and the Revolutionary Guards
Khamenei’s killing paved the way for a more radical leadership and dramatically strengthened the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has since consolidated its grip on Iran’s centers of power and decision-making processes.
Rather than weakening the regime, his elimination contributed to the emergence of a leadership that is more willing to take significant risks in its confrontation with Israel and the United States.
2. Khamenei as a Restraining Force on Iran’s Nuclear Program
Contrary to the prevailing narrative in Israel, Khamenei himself had long been one of the principal obstacles to a political decision to develop nuclear weapons.
He allowed Iran to advance technologically but refrained from authorizing the critical step toward actual nuclear weaponization.
Claims by Israeli leaders that Iran already possessed nuclear weapons, or that the war prevented Tehran from placing a nuclear warhead on a missile and launching it at Israel, belong more to the realm of science fiction than to serious, intelligence-based assessments.
3. A Radical Ideologue, but a Cautious Leader
Khamenei was no Zionist, no pacifist, and certainly no friend of Israel. He was a deeply conservative Islamist ideologue who viewed Israel as an enemy that needed to be confronted.
Yet despite his radical worldview, he was also an extremely cautious leader when it came to the direct use of Iranian military force, particularly against Israel and the United States.
His fear of a war that could threaten the survival of the Islamic Republic was a central consideration in his decision-making.
Failing to distinguish between ideological radicalism and a willingness to take military risks was a fundamental analytical mistake.
4. Giving New Life to a Regime in Crisis
Even more troubling, Khamenei’s killing gave the Islamic Republic, which had been facing a profound internal crisis following some of the most serious waves of protests in its history, an opportunity to rally around the perception of an external threat.
Rather than accelerating the regime’s collapse, his elimination provided it with a political and ideological lifeline, particularly among its loyal support base.
Those who assumed that eliminating the Supreme Leader would lead to the disintegration of the Iranian political system fundamentally misunderstood the depth and resilience of the institutions and power structures underpinning the Islamic Republic.
5. A Significant Military Achievement, but a Greater Long-Term Nuclear Risk
There is no question that Operation Rising Lion achieved significant operational successes in damaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, particularly following the American strike on Fordow.
It is worth remembering that when Israel launched the war, there was no guarantee that the Trump administration would agree to strike the facility.
But operational success does not eliminate the broader strategic question.
The fact that Iran is not currently enriching uranium does not necessarily tell us what its future intentions will be.
On the contrary, with Khamenei gone and the restraints he imposed no longer in place, and as Iran’s leadership draws lessons from the war, the argument that nuclear weapons represent the ultimate insurance policy against another attack may become increasingly persuasive in Tehran.
Destroying capabilities is not the same as eliminating motivation. In some cases, it may actually strengthen it.
6. The Danger That Israel Has Learned Nothing
Perhaps most concerning is the growing impression that Israel has still not drawn the necessary lessons.
Instead of critically examining the assumptions that led to the war, and the gap between military achievements and strategic outcomes, some appear determined to convince the Israeli public once again that another preventive war against Iran is necessary, potentially even before the upcoming Israeli elections.
Yet no convincing answer has been provided to the most fundamental question:
What exactly would another war achieve that the previous one failed to accomplish, and why should we expect a different outcome this time?
The Bottom Line
You can eliminate a leader, destroy nuclear facilities, and severely degrade military capabilities, and still leave Israel in a worse strategic position.
Khamenei’s killing illustrates the dangerous gap between operational success and strategic success.
Instead of confronting a weaker, more restrained, and more deterred Iran, Israel now faces a more radical leadership, a more powerful Revolutionary Guard, and potentially an even stronger motivation to acquire nuclear weapons.
The real tragedy would be if, after everything that has happened, we chose to repeat precisely the same mistake, believing that another round of military force could solve problems that the use of force itself has helped make worse.
#IranWar
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