Икономика ⇒ Икономиката на Русия и външната ѝ политика

[bigdragon]

Не е май, а наистина.
Само че между заповед за арест и арест има разлика.

[rki]

Арестувани са задочно от съда. Мисля, че този в Лефтерово.

И това не е "заповед за арест", която се издава от полицията/прокуратурата при първоначалното задържане, а взета мярка за неотклонение от съда по текущи разследвания/дела.

https://twitter.com/revishvilig/status/ ... 3741348865

https://theins.ru/news/261168

[kota]

Някакви протести на мюсюлмани вървят в Русия?

https://t.me/grey_zone/18401

[Dinain]

Арестувани са задочно от съда. Мисля, че този в Лефтерово.

И това не е "заповед за арест", която се издава от полицията/прокуратурата при първоначалното задържане, а взета мярка за неотклонение от съда по текущи разследвания/дела.

https://twitter.com/revishvilig/status/ ... 3741348865

https://theins.ru/news/261168

Защо Буданов, а не направо Зеленски? Или Байдън.

Егати пропагандните глупости. Все едно Хага да обяви, че "задочно са арестували" Путин.

[Dinain]

Russian Arms Sales to India Stall on Fears Over US Sanctions

India payments for Russia military equipment stuck for a year
Impasse threatens to hurt India’s readiness on China border

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... #xj4y7vzkg

Големи проблеми с търговията с оръжие между Русия и Индия. Този пост обяснява:
https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/164 ... VtcJg&s=19

Повече от година вече Индия не плаща около $2 млрд. дължими вноски на Русия, в резултат на което Русия задържа 2 от 5 поръчани батареи С-400 и друго въоръжение. Също е спряла кредитна линия от $10 млрд. за резервни части и муниции.

Причината е, че Индия не иска да плати в долари, от страх че ще попадне под вторични санкции на САЩ. Не може да плати и в рубли, защото не може да купи толкова на свободния пазар и на добър курс, а Русия не иска да вземе рупии, защото бил нестабилен курсът.

Цветущо положение за отечествения ВПК и световната доминация на БРИКС

ПП От коментарите: Путин предпочитал юани...

[Dinain]

Арестувани са задочно от съда. Мисля, че този в Лефтерово.

И това не е "заповед за арест", която се издава от полицията/прокуратурата при първоначалното задържане, а взета мярка за неотклонение от съда по текущи разследвания/дела.

https://twitter.com/revishvilig/status/ ... 3741348865

https://theins.ru/news/261168

Защо Буданов, а не направо Зеленски? Или Байдън.

Егати пропагандните глупости. Все едно Хага да обяви, че "задочно са арестували" Путин.

Сега разбрах - Буданов е "арестуван" за "терористичното взривяване на керченския мост".

[rki]

Циганите, евреите и комунистите се оказаха чистокръвни руснаци. До един!




А чичко Ленин и чичко Сталин са нацисти...

[Dinain]

Duracell напуска Русия.

[rki]

Според руските медии и външно министерство се очаква днес Германия да изгони над 30 руски дипломати. Самолета, който ще ги прибере вече кацна в Берлин от Москва.

https://twitter.com/Faytuks/status/1649732721290223620

[Amazon]

Duracell напуска Русия.

Яко! Косматите, некъпани гъски, които с гордост и радост изпращат мъжете си в месомелачката на СВО, ще останат без батерии за вибраторите.

[Dinain]

Световната икономика вече се нуждае по-малко от Русия

Една година след инвазията на Путин в Украйна е очевидно, че Русия окончателно е загубила някогашната си икономическа мощ на световния пазар. Благодарение и на необичайно топлата зима в Европа енергийното изнудване на Путин се провали, а най-голямата жертва на газовия му гамбит беше самата Русия. Влиянието на Путин върху пазара на природен газ вече не съществува, тъй като светът, и най-вече Европа, вече не се нуждае от руски газ...

► Show Spoiler

Москва се надяваше, че европейците ще се обърнат срещу своите лидери и ще направят политически неизгодно да продължат да подкрепят Украйна.

Експерти смятат, че дните на скъпа енергия в световен мащаб на фона на "свиване на доставките, предизвикано от Русия", приключиха окончателно.

На ключови пазари на метали като кобалт и никел добивът на нови мини, които ще бъдат открити през следващите две години, е достатъчен, за да замени руските метали в глобалните вериги за доставки.
През по-голямата част от миналата година и след нахлуването в Украйна през февруари руският президент Владимир Путин разчиташе на енергийното си оръжие, за да държи световната икономика като заложник. Москва спря доставките на природен газ за Европа, надявайки се, че европейците ще се обърнат срещу своите лидери и ще направят политически неизгодно да продължат да подкрепят Украйна.

Заплахата беше сериозна - през 2021 г. 83% от руския газ е доставян за Европа. Общият глобален износ на Русия от 7 млн. барела петрол дневно и 200 млрд. куб. метра тръбопроводен газ годишно осигуряваше около половината от федералните ѝ приходи. Още по-важно е, че износът на суровини от Русия играе решаваща роля в световните вериги за доставки: Европа разчиташе на Русия за 46% от общите си доставки на газ, като имаше сравними нива на зависимост от други руски продукти, включително метали и торове.

Една година след инвазията на Путин в Украйна е очевидно, че Русия окончателно е загубила някогашната си икономическа мощ на световния пазар. Благодарение и на необичайно топлата зима в Европа енергийното изнудване на Путин се провали, а най-голямата жертва на газовия му гамбит беше самата Русия. Влиянието на Путин върху пазара на природен газ вече не съществува, тъй като светът, и най-вече Европа, вече не се нуждае от руски газ.

Загуба на европейския газов пазар

Европа бързо си осигури алтернативни доставки на газ, като се ориентира към втечнен природен газ (LNG). Това включва близо 55 млрд. куб.м от САЩ, което е два и половина пъти повече от предвоенния износ на LNG от САЩ за Европа. В съчетание с увеличаването на възобновяеми източници, ядрена енергия и въглища тези алтернативни доставки намалиха зависимостта на Европа от руския газ до 9% от общия внос на газ.

Джефри Зоненфелд, професор по мениджмънт от Lester Crown, и Стивън Тиан, директор на изследванията в Института за лидерство на Yale University, пишат в анализ за сп. Foreign Policy, че сега Европа купува повече втечнен природен газ, отколкото някога е купувала руски газ.

Освен това необичайно топлата зима в Европа означава, че не само са избегнати най-лошите сценарии, но и че пълните хранилища не са изчерпани и могат да останат за следващата зима. През януари германските газови хранилища бяха рекордно пълни - 91%, в сравнение с 54% през миналата година, което означава, че през 2023 г. Европа ще трябва да купува значително по-малко газ, отколкото през 2022 г.

Така Европа има гарантирани енергийни доставки поне до 2024 г., което ще й осигури достатъчно време за пълноценно въвеждане и функциониране на по-евтини алтернативни енергийни доставки. Това включва завършването на допълнителен капацитет за доставки на втечнен природен газ от 200 млрд. куб.м годишно до 2024 г. - достатъчен, за да замени напълно и трайно руския износ на газ от 200 млрд. куб.м годишно.

Експерти смятат, че дните на скъпа енергия в световен мащаб на фона на "свиване на доставките, предизвикано от Русия" приключиха окончателно. В допълнение към очакваното по-ниско търсене на втечнен природен газ в Европа Китай ограничава доставките на глобалния втечнен природен газ в полза на местни източници. В съчетание с бързо увеличаващото се предлагане на втечнен природен газ не е изненада, че фючърсният пазар сега определя по-ниска цена от предвоенните нива.

Путин не разполага с друг лост за влияние, няма как да замени някогашния си основен клиент и открива по трудния начин, че за потребителите е много по-лесно да заменят ненадеждните доставчици на суровини, отколкото за доставчиците да намерят нови пазари. Анализаторите отбелязват, че Русия вече не получава почти никаква печалба от продажбата на газ, тъй като доставките на 150 млрд. куб.м по тръбопроводи за Европа бяха заменени с едва 16 млрд. куб.м за Китай и значително по-малко средства от износ на втечнен природен газ, които едва стигат за покриване на разходите.

Путин няма пазари, с които да замени доставките за Европа - Китай не разполага с необходимия капацитет на тръбопроводите, за да поеме повече за поне десетилетие, и освен това предпочита местни и диверсифицирани източници на енергия.

Проблеми и при петрола

Лостовете на Путин в областта на петрола също намаляват. Далеч назад останаха времената, когато страхът от това, че Путин може да спре руските доставки на петрол, водеше до рязък скок на цените. Всъщност, когато в отговор на въвеждането на тавана на цените на петрола от Г-7 Путин обяви забрана от 1 февруари за износ на петрол за страните, които приеха тавана, котировките на петрола... се понижиха.

А това се случи, защото вече е ясно, че светът не зависи от руския петрол. Пазарът на петрол се обръща в полза на купувачите, а не на продавачите, на фона на нарастващото предлагане - а това е повече от достатъчно, за да компенсира възможните спадове в руския добив на нефт, въпреки че ОПЕК и Саудитска Арабия подкрепят Кремъл с решенията си за свиване на добива.

В опит да покачи цените на суровината Кремъл намали производството на петрол с 500 хил. барела на ден през март - това прави около 5% от общия обем. Последният голям спад в руския добив на петрол беше през миналия април, когато се понижи с почти 9% след въвеждането на западните санкции срещу Украйна. Оттогава Русия успя да създаде нови логистични вериги за продажбите на петрол, най-вече в Азия.

Цените на петрола сега са по-ниски в сравнение с преди войната, а през втората половина на 2022 г. имаше рязко увеличение на предлагането с 4 млн. барела дневно от производители като САЩ, Венецуела, Канада и Бразилия. С още по-голямо предлагане, което се очаква през тази година, всеки загубен барел руски суров петрол ще бъде безпроблемно бързо заменен. Путин убеди Саудитска Арабия да се притече на помощ, като намали драстично производствените квоти на ОПЕК+, но кралството може да се лиши от важни оръжейни и технологични трансфери от САЩ на фона на засиления международен контрол върху значителния излишък от неизползван капацитет на ОПЕК+.

Лостовете за влияние на Путин намаляха с влизането в сила на ценовия таван, който влошава енергийните позиции на Русия. Китай и Индия, без да участват изрично в ограничението, го използват, за да сключват изгодни сделки с Москва с големи отстъпки. Така,въпреки че Индия купува 33 пъти повече руски петрол, отколкото преди година, Русия не реализира голяма печалба. Все пак трябва да се има предвид, че през тази седмица OFAC, отделът по санкциите към Министерството на финансите на САЩ, издаде предупреждение за схеми за заобикаляне на тавана на цените на руския петрол. Това е първото официално признание, че Русия заобикаля тавана - поне по отношение на доставките на суров петрол ESPO от пристанищата в Далечния изток.

През миналата година добивът на петрол в Русия опроверга многобройните прогнози за спад, като се повиши с 2% до 535 млн. т (10.7 млн. барела на ден) благодарение на ръста на продажбите в Азия. Сега обаче Русия е изправена пред повече предизвикателства при продажбата на суровината, която е най-важният източник за приходи за държавния бюджет, който отчете дефицит от 25 млрд. долара през януари и почти 30 млрд. към края на март. Проблемите се задълбочиха през първото тримесечие, като бюджетните приходи са се свили с 21% на годишна база заради намалелите приходи от нефт и газ. Постъпленията от важните за Русия две енергийни суровини са се сринали с 45% заради спада на цената на петрола "Уралс" и на намаляването на износа на газ.

По-ниските обеми на износа свиха излишъка по текущата сметка на Русия през първото тримесечие с 51 млрд. долара, или почти четири пъти на годишна база, до 18.6 млрд. от 69.8 млрд. долара. Това е най-ниският излишък за първото тримесечие от 2016 г. насам.

Година след началото на агресията тези данни са пореден знак за високата цена, която Москва плаща за войната си в Украйна, а в същото време натискът на санкциите срещу руската икономика се засилва. Енергийните ресурси обикновено носят на Русия около половината от приходите в бюджета, като през миналата година са били приблизително 11.6 трлн. рубли (163 млрд. долара). След техния спад обаче държавата се оказва принудена да продава своите резерви, за да покрие дефицита.

Според базовия сценарий на Руската централна банка излишъкът по текущата сметка се очаква да бъде 66 млрд. долара при средногодишна цена от 55 долара за барел "Уралс". През миналата година той достигна рекордните 227 млрд. долара.

Икономистът на Bloomberg Economics за Русия Александър Исаков очаква по-малкият излишък през следващите тримесечия да доведе до отслабване на рублата и намаляване на потребителско доверие. София Донец от Renaissance Capital смята, че излишъкът по текущата сметка ще бъде още по-малък през второто тримесечие - и вероятно най-ниският за годината - и високата волатилност на рублата няма да стихне.

Провал и при храните

Освен енергийните, другите стокови козове на Путин също са изчерпани. Опитът му да изнудва с доставките на пшеница се провали. На някои пазари на метали, където Русия исторически доминираше, като никел, паладий и титан, купувачите, които се страхуват от изнудване, в съчетание с по-високите цени ускориха преместването на производството и съживиха публични и частни инвестиции в критични проекти по веригата за доставки на минерали и в минната индустиря. Те са предимно в Северна и Южна Америка и Африка, където се намират много неизползвани минерални запаси. Всъщност на няколко ключови пазара на метали като кобалт и никел комбинираният добив на нови мини, които ще бъдат открити през следващите две години, е повече от достатъчен, за да замени руските метали в глобалните вериги за доставки, отбелязват Джефри Зоненфелд и Стивън Тиан.

Неуспешните икономически ходове на Путин са поредната серия от грешни изчисления, които се прибавят към един все по-дълъг списък - от подценяването на Украйна до подценяването на единството и волята на Запада. Разбира се, агресията на Путин не остана без последствия. Тя се отрази на живота на много хора, включително в България, доведе до промяна на веригите за доставки, а потребителите все още усещат тежестта на по-високите цени. Но най-важното е, че Путин няма да бъде в състояние да предизвика повече трусове в световната икономика, защото Русия загуби най-важния си коз - енергийната и суровинната си мощ.

https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikono ... ot_rusiia/#

Слагам цялата статия в спойлер, защото е с платен достъп.

[centara]

И от мен един анализ с платен достъп - от The Economist. Препоръчвам

► Show Spoiler

Russia’s economy can withstand a long war, but not a more intense one

Its defences against Western sanctions can only stretch so far

A week after Russia invaded Ukraine last year, Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, crowed, “The value of the ruble has plummeted; the Russian stockmarket closed as fear of capital flight rose; interest rates more than doubled; Russia’s credit rating has been cut to junk status.” American authorities clearly hoped that the “massive, unprecedented consequences” they and their allies had imposed on Russia, including “severe and lasting economic costs”, would help bring the war to a speedy conclusion. Yet over the following year, despite the repeated tightening of Western sanctions, Russia’s economy recovered its poise. The imf expects it to grow by 0.7% this year–on a par with France, and even as the British and German economies shrink. The hope that the state of Russia’s economy will provide any sort of constraint on the war has faded.

Such despair, however, is as misguided as Mr Blinken’s initial euphoria. By the admission of none other than Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, “The illegitimate restrictions imposed on the Russian economy in the medium term may indeed have a negative impact on it.” The question is not so much whether Russia can endure an even longer war of attrition (it can), but whether it can support the sort of intensification of the conflict Russia will probably need to transform its prospects on the battlefield. That looks almost impossible.

Russia’s economic managers have achieved three feats over the past 14 months. They have found ways to withstand the fusillade of sanctions that Mr Blinken heralded. They have supplied enough men and materiel to propel Russia’s invasion. And all this has been done without a sharp decline in living standards, which might prompt popular unrest. But any attempt to escalate the conflict would inevitably undo these successes.

Russia is having to cope with the broadest array of sanctions ever imposed on a big country, including on individuals associated with the war, on financial transactions involving Russian entities, on exports of certain goods to Russia and on imports of most goods from Russia. Yet this economic assault has yielded disappointing results, in part because there were always big holes in the sanctions regime and in part because Russia has found ways around some of the restrictions that did initially hem it in.

Some of the showiest measures have targeted oligarchs and other cronies of Mr Putin’s regime. World-Check, a data firm, reckons that 2,215 individuals with close ties to the government can no longer travel to some or all Western countries, or access their possessions there, or both. Some wealthy Russians have complained about their lost social standing. A few have left Russia and renounced their citizenship.

Despite the reports of impounded superyachts, however, most kleptocrats are still putting caviar on the table. Foreign governments have frozen about $100bn-worth of private Russian assets—only about a quarter of the $400bn that Russian households have abroad. The biggest imposition on many rich Russians relates to their holidays. The French Riviera is off limits; Dubai and Antalya are the main substitutes. Sanctions, perversely, may pave the way for the creation of a new generation of oligarchs. With Western firms leaving the country en masse, there are hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of assets up for grabs. If the intention behind the measures was to cause discomfort among Mr Putin’s inner circle, there is little sign of it.

Financial sanctions, too, have had a limited effect. After Russia invaded Ukraine, ten Russian lenders were kicked out of swift, which more than 11,000 banks around the world use for cross-border payments. Close to two-thirds of Russia’s banking system can no longer process transactions in euros or dollars.

But Western countries have not cut off Russian banks entirely, as they need to pay for the Russian oil and gas they continue to import. Gazprombank, which processes these payments, remains a member of swift. What is more, new financial pipes are being built to replace Western ones. Average daily transactions using CIPS, China’s alternative to swift, have increased by 50% since the invasion began. This past December 16% of Russia’s exports were paid for in yuan, up from almost none before the war. The narrow gap between the price at which Russian banks sell their customers yuan and the price at which they buy yuan suggests a liquid market. Some international transactions are also settled, with difficulty, in Indian rupees and Emirati dirhams.

Restrictions on exports of certain goods to Russia have also disappointed. America and its allies have banned sales to Russia of thousands of high-tech items, while many Western firms that used to operate in Russia have voluntarily pulled out. Of about 3,000 global firms with a Russian presence tracked by the kse Institute at the Kyiv School of Economics, roughly half have curtailed operations there in some way. Last year the stock of foreign direct investment in Russia fell by a quarter.

Yet Russia continues to import almost as much as it did before the invasion. New trading partners have sprung up to replace the West. China now sells twice as much to Russia as it did in 2019. “Parallel” imports—unauthorised sales from the West to Russia via a third country of everything from fizzy drinks to computer chips—have soared. In 2022 imports from the eu to Armenia mysteriously doubled, even as Armenian exports to Russia tripled. Serbia’s exports of phones to Russia rose from $8,518 in 2021 to $37m in 2022. Shipments of washing machines from Kazakhstan to Russia rose from zero in 2021 to nearly 100,000 units last year.

These arrangements have drawbacks. Russia’s economic hubs are nearer to Brussels than to Beijing. Higher transport costs mean higher prices. People also have less choice than before (one Muscovite complains about the difficulty of finding mortadella). According to a recent survey by Romir, a Russian market-research firm, two-thirds of Russians reckon the quality of the products they buy is deteriorating.

What is more, not all goods can be obtained in sufficient quantities through backchannels. Many Russian-made medications, which depend on imported raw materials, are in short supply. The car industry, meanwhile, is struggling with a shortage of imported semiconductors. Production was down 70% in January-February, compared to the same period a year before.

Yet even if Russia cannot make as many cars any more, it can still import them. After Lada, a Soviet stalwart, the most popular brand in Russia is now Haval, a mid-range Chinese marque. Its monthly sales have increased 331% over the past year.

Russia also seems to be getting hold of the parts it needs to keep its civilian planes airborne, somehow. Hackers have been stealing updates of aircraft software that Russian firms can no longer buy. Crashes, although frequent by Western standards, have not increased.

The impact of sanctions on Russia’s exports has been bigger–but Western countries always shied away from making them too severe for fear of pushing up energy prices for their own consumers to unbearable levels. The eu’s imports of Russian gas have fallen dramatically. Russia has limited capacity to divert the exports to China, since the pipeline linking the two countries is small. Shipping more by sea requires new liquefaction plants which take time to build and need sophisticated tech. Rystad Energy, a consultancy, forecasts that Russia’s gas sales will dwindle to 136bn cubic metres (bcm) in 2023 from 241bcm in 2021.

Oil, however, is more fungible. In December the eu, which in 2021 bought more than 40% of Russia’s crude exports, imposed an import ban. It also forbade its shipping firms, insurers and financiers from facilitating the sale of Russian crude to buyers in other countries unless the price per barrel was below $60. In February a similar package of sanctions came into force on Russia’s refined oil, a smaller but profitable export, much of which also went to Europe before the war.

But Asian buyers have been happy to absorb the oil that Europe is spurning. In March nearly 90% of Russia’s total crude exports went to China and India, estimates Reid I’Anson of Kpler, a data firm, up from a quarter before the war. That month Russia shipped 3.7m barrels a day (b/d) on average, more than it did in 2021. March was also a strong month for sales of refined products such as diesel. A new ecosystem of shadow traders and shippers, largely based in Hong Kong and Dubai, has emerged to help ferry the embargoed barrels to their new destinations, often with the help of Russian lenders and insurers. These new buyers, plus high commodity prices brought about in part by the war, helped push Russia’s current-account surplus to a record $227bn—10% of gdp.

But it is unlikely to see another bumper year. The price of a barrel of Brent, an oil benchmark, has fallen below $85 from an average of $100 in 2022 (see chart 1). Urals, Russia’s main grade, now sells at a steep discount at Russian ports—below $50 on average in January and February, according to the ministry of finance, compared to $76 on average in 2022. Russia would need a price of well over $100 a barrel to balance its budget, analysts estimate. The International Energy Agency, a watchdog, reckons Russia’s oil revenues were 43% lower in March than a year earlier. Economists expect the country’s current-account surplus to fall to 3-4% of gdp this year, in line with the average of the 2010s.

Lower hydrocarbon sales mean lower government revenues. In 2022 the Russian government ran a deficit of about 3trn roubles ($37bn), or 2% of gdp. This year it is planning something similar, but actual spending and taxation data so far this year make that look optimistic. A deficit in the range of at least 10trn roubles, as much as 5% of gdp, looks likelier—high by Russian standards.

All the same, the Russian state has plenty of options to fund itself. Russia’s sovereign-wealth fund still has about $150bn (about 10% of gdp), even after being drained of about $30bn last year. The government could also issue more debt. Last year’s bumper exports have left big Russian energy firms with lots of cash they must stash somewhere. Those firms, which are largely state-owned anyway, could also be hit with a windfall tax, as they were last year. And Russian financial institutions hold sufficient assets to cover 10trn-rouble deficits for 25 years–a huge resource the government might seek to tap in some way. Richard Connolly, an expert on the Russian economy at rusi, a think-tank, says, “The government can always fund itself by taking money from big companies.”

Money, in other words, will not be a severe constraint on the war effort. Demands on the budget for this purpose are in any case modest. Our best guess, based on comparing actual spending figures with what was budgeted before the war, is that Russia’s assault on Ukraine is currently costing it about 5trn roubles a year, or 3% of gdp–less than America spent on the Korean war.

But replacing damaged weapons and spent munitions is not simply a question of money. Russia has churned through military equipment on a vast scale. Estimates of the number of armoured vehicles destroyed during the war, for example, range between 8,000 and 16,000, according to a recent report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (csis), a think-tank. Russia has also lost lots of aircraft, drones and artillery systems.

One solution is to fall back on existing stocks, although many of these are old and in poor repair. Another is to redirect weapons intended for export to the front line. Siemon Wezeman of sipri, a Swedish think-tank, reckons Russia’s arms exports plummeted from $50bn in 2021 to $11bn or less last year. He points out that unusual t-90 tanks—perhaps demonstration models, or units originally destined for Algeria—have been spotted on the battlefield in Ukraine.

Russia is also trying to make more weapons. Dmitri Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s security council, recently said the country would produce 1,500 modern tanks in 2023. Officials have also said they want drones to be manufactured en masse in Russia. Some factories are working around the clock. The government is lending lavishly to arms manufacturers, or ordering banks to do so. In January and February production of “finished metal goods” was 20% higher than the year before, according to official statistics.

The problem is that, to manufacture advanced weapons, it needs access to Western-made, high-end “dual-use” components, from engines to microchips, that are hard to obtain because of Western sanctions. Desperately needed parts can always be diverted to their most urgent use. Thus in February the government temporarily stopped accepting applications for biometric passports to save microchips. High-end washing machines are also being imported in large numbers to be stripped of their chips, presumably for use in guided missiles and other military kit. Ukraine’s military intelligence recently reported that every month Russia manages to make around 30 Kh-101s and 20 Kalibrs, its two main types of guided missile, presumably thanks to such ruses.

But the volumes of advanced weaponry produced is nowhere near what Russia needs to replace its depleting stocks. Ukrainian and Western military officials believe that Russia has used most of its stocks of its most accurate guided missiles. Serial numbers found in the wreckage of spent missiles suggest it is now using new ones, made during the war. Insiders say the army is asking for ten times more tanks than Russia’s factories can produce. A lack of software and technical equipment also seems to be preventing Russia’s production of drones from taking off.

What Russia lacks in quality, however, it may partly compensate for in quantity—by gussying up Soviet-era weapons. It is modernising perhaps 90 old tanks a month by equipping them with new electronics and communication systems. It is refurbishing old missiles that are less accurate but difficult to intercept and repurposing nuclear delivery systems to launch them. It is cannibalising civilian planes to repair fighter jets.

Russia is also getting military supplies from allies. Some artillery shells appear to be arriving from China, via Belarus. Russia is also buying (ostensibly civilian) drones from its eastern neighbour, as well as artillery shells from North Korea. It reportedly also traded 60 Su-35 aircraft with Iran in exchange for several thousand kamikaze drones. In short, the quality of Russian weapons is declining, but it has found ways to avoid running out.

Finding enough people to keep the war effort going is another challenge. Many have been killed in action; many more have emigrated. In the year to December 2022 the number of employed Russians under the age of 35 fell by 1.3m, according to FinExpertiza, an auditor. Shortages of workers are common. In December the central bank said that half of firms surveyed were struggling to find enough staff. There are 2.5 vacancies for every unemployed person, making the Russian labour market twice as tight as America’s. Wages are growing fast. Specialists, such as IT engineers and lawyers, are especially scarce. At a recent meeting of Russia’s entrepreneurs union, the labour shortage was the main topic of conversation.

The labour shortage makes life difficult for military recruiters, too. The army is now sending conscription and mobilisation notices by email, in addition to physical copies, to make it harder for people to pretend they have not seen them. Draftees are not allowed to leave the country. With enough coercion, though, Russia should have no trouble filling its ranks. The country is not about to run out of young men: before the war there were about 17m of them. But more people on the frontline means fewer people in offices and factories. And the more widespread conscription becomes in big cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg, the greater the chance of popular unrest.

The government’s third economic achievement has been to maintain living standards. Last year it spent an extra 3% of gdp to stimulate the economy. Aside from higher spending on the military, support is coming in the form of economic aid to civilian companies: direct handouts to firms, subsidised loans, joint investments and so on. Spending on the budget category that subsumes many of these items, “national economy”, rose by 20% in 2022, to 4.3trn roubles. Between January and mid-March it increased by another 45% compared with the same period last year. Banks are being asked to give indebted firms breathing room. In 2022 business failures fell to a seven-year low.

Last year “social” spending also rose, from 6trn to 7trn roubles (4.5% of gdp). However, says Vladimir Milov, a former deputy minister of energy, the federal government accounts for only part of overall social spending. The pension fund—a nominally independent agency recently renamed the Social Fund—is also doling out cash to retirees, mothers, the disabled and more, as are regional governments. Allowances towards constituencies important to Mr Putin, such as families with more than one child, the poor and the elderly, are growing, notes Maria Snegovaya of csis. Outside Moscow, payments to the families of dead conscripts can be enough to buy a flat.

All this may explain why the war has not affected Russian living standards all that much. Consumer prices did rise by 12% last year, in large part because of a depreciation of the rouble in the spring. Average pay at medium-sized and large companies, which include many state-owned entities, rose marginally last year even after accounting for inflation. The value of people’s savings has fallen only slightly, central-bank statistics suggest. Inflation fell back to 3.5% in March.

Overall, the Russian economy has proved resilient. Real gdp fell by only 2-3% last year—far less than the 10-15% decline that many economists had predicted. A “current activity indicator” compiled by Goldman Sachs, a bank, which correlated closely with official gdp numbers before the war, shows that Russia emerged from recession about a year ago. Most forecasters believe the economy will grow this year (see chart 2).

All this suggests that Mr Putin should be able to maintain the war effort for some time to come. Expanding it, however, is another matter. Some on the right are calling for Mr Putin to spend more than a few percentage points of gdp on the invasion. After all, Russia has embraced total war before—including in 1942 and 1943, when it spent an astonishing 60% of its gdp on the military, according to “Accounting for War”, a book by Mark Harrison published in 1996.

But it is hard to see how Mr Putin could do that while maintaining economic stability and preserving living standards. The first problem would be raising money fast. Not all the sovereign-wealth fund’s assets are liquid. Printing money would spur inflation, causing the rouble to lose value and eroding the living standards the government has worked so hard to preserve. Loading up banks with huge amounts of public debt overnight might have a similar effect, stirring doubts about how soundly the economy was being managed. Tax rises or a big shift in public expenditure towards defence would also eat into personal incomes, And any of these measures would undermine the air of calm, control and stability that Mr Putin is at pains to maintain. “Of course, national defence is the top priority,” he said recently, “but in resolving strategic tasks in this area, we should not repeat the mistakes of the past and should not destroy our own economy.”

It’s unclear that spending vastly more money would achieve the desired results anyway. Russia’s economy has become more centralised, but it is not the planned, command-and-control apparatus of the Soviet times. Converting a budgetary bazooka into weapons of a more conventional sort would thus, at best, take time. The effort would exacerbate the bottlenecks that are already constricting Russia’s military output, in machinery subject to sanctions, for example, and in skilled workers. Much would depend on the continued assistance of China, the Gulf states and other countries through which Russian capital and imports flow–and they might be nervous about abetting a big Russian escalation.

Throwing the kitchen sink at Ukraine therefore looks out of the question. “Considering Russia’s existing capabilities and limitations, it will likely opt for a slower-paced attritional campaign in Ukraine,” asserts the csis report. Mr Putin has succeeded in insulating the Russian economy from the worst effects of war and sanctions–but in a way that makes the war hard to win.

[Tonev3333]

Съблича рускините голи за да не крадът на работа. Толкоз. https://twitter.com/igorsushko/status/1 ... 30688?s=20

[Dinain]

Съблича рускините голи за да не крадът на работа. Толкоз. https://twitter.com/igorsushko/status/1 ... 30688?s=20

В интерес на истината, това не изглежда да е свързано с икономиката на Русия. В коментарите има аналогична статия от юли 2022 г.
https://english.pravda.ru/news/society/ ... warehouse/

Същата компания, Wildberries. Явно много се краде в складовете

Един бивш колега е работил в златна мина в Швеция. Също са ги претърсвали. Та не е еднозначно.

[Dinain]

Paris, Kyiv, Baltic states dismayed after China envoy questions Ukraine sovereignty
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/fr ... 023-04-23/

Записът:
https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/sta ... 4iJMQ&s=19

Чудех се къде да го пусна и дали. От вчера се вихри дипломатически скандал, след като китайският посланик във Франция по време на интервю заяви, че дали Крим е украински или руски "зависело от перспективата", а всички бивши съветски републики нямали "ефективен статут" според "международното право".

Прибалтийските републики и Украйна са изразили възмущение и настояват Китай веднага да изясни позицията си.

Понеже китаецът говори френски, наистина се надявам да е някаква грешка в превода или мозъчна пръдня, иначе е наистина скандално.

Пекин засега мълчи...

[plamenhk]

Мюсюлманите в Москва... бъдещето на Руският Православен Мир никак не изглежда розово.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1650200171488092161

[EddieBG]

Мюсюлманите в Москва... бъдещето на Руският Православен Мир никак не изглежда розово.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1650200171488092161

Най-голямата европейска джамия е Baitul Futuh в Лондон - две минарета, съответно високи 36 и 25 метра. Поема 6,000 молещи се.

В Моска джамията Ахмат Кадиров е с 4 минарета, високи по 62 метра, и събира 10,000 молещи се.

[plamenhk]

Най-голямата европейска джамия е Baitul Futuh в Лондон - две минарета, съответно високи 36 и 25 метра. Поема 6,000 молещи се.

В Моска джамията Ахмат Кадиров е с 4 минарета, високи по 62 метра, и събира 10,000 молещи се.

«Впереди планеты всей» !



Според Генералната прокуратура от април 2022 г. броят на престъпленията в Русия, свързани с използването на огнестрелни оръжия и боеприпаси, се е увеличил с 32% и тези цифри може да са подценени. Повечето от оръжията се озоваха в граничните Курска и Белгородска област, както и в Москва. Сред лидерите в кражбите на оръжия са елитните части на Министерството на отбраната, псковските парашутисти, специалните части на ГРУ и частите на вътрешните войски на Министерството на вътрешните работи.
https://twitter.com/anno1540/status/1649910760229797888

[Almasy]

И от мен един анализ с платен достъп - от The Economist. Препоръчвам

► Show Spoiler

Russia’s economy can withstand a long war, but not a more intense one

Its defences against Western sanctions can only stretch so far

A week after Russia invaded Ukraine last year, Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, crowed, “The value of the ruble has plummeted; the Russian stockmarket closed as fear of capital flight rose; interest rates more than doubled; Russia’s credit rating has been cut to junk status.” American authorities clearly hoped that the “massive, unprecedented consequences” they and their allies had imposed on Russia, including “severe and lasting economic costs”, would help bring the war to a speedy conclusion. Yet over the following year, despite the repeated tightening of Western sanctions, Russia’s economy recovered its poise. The imf expects it to grow by 0.7% this year–on a par with France, and even as the British and German economies shrink. The hope that the state of Russia’s economy will provide any sort of constraint on the war has faded.

Such despair, however, is as misguided as Mr Blinken’s initial euphoria. By the admission of none other than Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, “The illegitimate restrictions imposed on the Russian economy in the medium term may indeed have a negative impact on it.” The question is not so much whether Russia can endure an even longer war of attrition (it can), but whether it can support the sort of intensification of the conflict Russia will probably need to transform its prospects on the battlefield. That looks almost impossible.

Russia’s economic managers have achieved three feats over the past 14 months. They have found ways to withstand the fusillade of sanctions that Mr Blinken heralded. They have supplied enough men and materiel to propel Russia’s invasion. And all this has been done without a sharp decline in living standards, which might prompt popular unrest. But any attempt to escalate the conflict would inevitably undo these successes.

Russia is having to cope with the broadest array of sanctions ever imposed on a big country, including on individuals associated with the war, on financial transactions involving Russian entities, on exports of certain goods to Russia and on imports of most goods from Russia. Yet this economic assault has yielded disappointing results, in part because there were always big holes in the sanctions regime and in part because Russia has found ways around some of the restrictions that did initially hem it in.

Some of the showiest measures have targeted oligarchs and other cronies of Mr Putin’s regime. World-Check, a data firm, reckons that 2,215 individuals with close ties to the government can no longer travel to some or all Western countries, or access their possessions there, or both. Some wealthy Russians have complained about their lost social standing. A few have left Russia and renounced their citizenship.

Despite the reports of impounded superyachts, however, most kleptocrats are still putting caviar on the table. Foreign governments have frozen about $100bn-worth of private Russian assets—only about a quarter of the $400bn that Russian households have abroad. The biggest imposition on many rich Russians relates to their holidays. The French Riviera is off limits; Dubai and Antalya are the main substitutes. Sanctions, perversely, may pave the way for the creation of a new generation of oligarchs. With Western firms leaving the country en masse, there are hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of assets up for grabs. If the intention behind the measures was to cause discomfort among Mr Putin’s inner circle, there is little sign of it.

Financial sanctions, too, have had a limited effect. After Russia invaded Ukraine, ten Russian lenders were kicked out of swift, which more than 11,000 banks around the world use for cross-border payments. Close to two-thirds of Russia’s banking system can no longer process transactions in euros or dollars.

But Western countries have not cut off Russian banks entirely, as they need to pay for the Russian oil and gas they continue to import. Gazprombank, which processes these payments, remains a member of swift. What is more, new financial pipes are being built to replace Western ones. Average daily transactions using CIPS, China’s alternative to swift, have increased by 50% since the invasion began. This past December 16% of Russia’s exports were paid for in yuan, up from almost none before the war. The narrow gap between the price at which Russian banks sell their customers yuan and the price at which they buy yuan suggests a liquid market. Some international transactions are also settled, with difficulty, in Indian rupees and Emirati dirhams.

Restrictions on exports of certain goods to Russia have also disappointed. America and its allies have banned sales to Russia of thousands of high-tech items, while many Western firms that used to operate in Russia have voluntarily pulled out. Of about 3,000 global firms with a Russian presence tracked by the kse Institute at the Kyiv School of Economics, roughly half have curtailed operations there in some way. Last year the stock of foreign direct investment in Russia fell by a quarter.

Yet Russia continues to import almost as much as it did before the invasion. New trading partners have sprung up to replace the West. China now sells twice as much to Russia as it did in 2019. “Parallel” imports—unauthorised sales from the West to Russia via a third country of everything from fizzy drinks to computer chips—have soared. In 2022 imports from the eu to Armenia mysteriously doubled, even as Armenian exports to Russia tripled. Serbia’s exports of phones to Russia rose from $8,518 in 2021 to $37m in 2022. Shipments of washing machines from Kazakhstan to Russia rose from zero in 2021 to nearly 100,000 units last year.

These arrangements have drawbacks. Russia’s economic hubs are nearer to Brussels than to Beijing. Higher transport costs mean higher prices. People also have less choice than before (one Muscovite complains about the difficulty of finding mortadella). According to a recent survey by Romir, a Russian market-research firm, two-thirds of Russians reckon the quality of the products they buy is deteriorating.

What is more, not all goods can be obtained in sufficient quantities through backchannels. Many Russian-made medications, which depend on imported raw materials, are in short supply. The car industry, meanwhile, is struggling with a shortage of imported semiconductors. Production was down 70% in January-February, compared to the same period a year before.

Yet even if Russia cannot make as many cars any more, it can still import them. After Lada, a Soviet stalwart, the most popular brand in Russia is now Haval, a mid-range Chinese marque. Its monthly sales have increased 331% over the past year.

Russia also seems to be getting hold of the parts it needs to keep its civilian planes airborne, somehow. Hackers have been stealing updates of aircraft software that Russian firms can no longer buy. Crashes, although frequent by Western standards, have not increased.

The impact of sanctions on Russia’s exports has been bigger–but Western countries always shied away from making them too severe for fear of pushing up energy prices for their own consumers to unbearable levels. The eu’s imports of Russian gas have fallen dramatically. Russia has limited capacity to divert the exports to China, since the pipeline linking the two countries is small. Shipping more by sea requires new liquefaction plants which take time to build and need sophisticated tech. Rystad Energy, a consultancy, forecasts that Russia’s gas sales will dwindle to 136bn cubic metres (bcm) in 2023 from 241bcm in 2021.

Oil, however, is more fungible. In December the eu, which in 2021 bought more than 40% of Russia’s crude exports, imposed an import ban. It also forbade its shipping firms, insurers and financiers from facilitating the sale of Russian crude to buyers in other countries unless the price per barrel was below $60. In February a similar package of sanctions came into force on Russia’s refined oil, a smaller but profitable export, much of which also went to Europe before the war.

But Asian buyers have been happy to absorb the oil that Europe is spurning. In March nearly 90% of Russia’s total crude exports went to China and India, estimates Reid I’Anson of Kpler, a data firm, up from a quarter before the war. That month Russia shipped 3.7m barrels a day (b/d) on average, more than it did in 2021. March was also a strong month for sales of refined products such as diesel. A new ecosystem of shadow traders and shippers, largely based in Hong Kong and Dubai, has emerged to help ferry the embargoed barrels to their new destinations, often with the help of Russian lenders and insurers. These new buyers, plus high commodity prices brought about in part by the war, helped push Russia’s current-account surplus to a record $227bn—10% of gdp.

But it is unlikely to see another bumper year. The price of a barrel of Brent, an oil benchmark, has fallen below $85 from an average of $100 in 2022 (see chart 1). Urals, Russia’s main grade, now sells at a steep discount at Russian ports—below $50 on average in January and February, according to the ministry of finance, compared to $76 on average in 2022. Russia would need a price of well over $100 a barrel to balance its budget, analysts estimate. The International Energy Agency, a watchdog, reckons Russia’s oil revenues were 43% lower in March than a year earlier. Economists expect the country’s current-account surplus to fall to 3-4% of gdp this year, in line with the average of the 2010s.

Lower hydrocarbon sales mean lower government revenues. In 2022 the Russian government ran a deficit of about 3trn roubles ($37bn), or 2% of gdp. This year it is planning something similar, but actual spending and taxation data so far this year make that look optimistic. A deficit in the range of at least 10trn roubles, as much as 5% of gdp, looks likelier—high by Russian standards.

All the same, the Russian state has plenty of options to fund itself. Russia’s sovereign-wealth fund still has about $150bn (about 10% of gdp), even after being drained of about $30bn last year. The government could also issue more debt. Last year’s bumper exports have left big Russian energy firms with lots of cash they must stash somewhere. Those firms, which are largely state-owned anyway, could also be hit with a windfall tax, as they were last year. And Russian financial institutions hold sufficient assets to cover 10trn-rouble deficits for 25 years–a huge resource the government might seek to tap in some way. Richard Connolly, an expert on the Russian economy at rusi, a think-tank, says, “The government can always fund itself by taking money from big companies.”

Money, in other words, will not be a severe constraint on the war effort. Demands on the budget for this purpose are in any case modest. Our best guess, based on comparing actual spending figures with what was budgeted before the war, is that Russia’s assault on Ukraine is currently costing it about 5trn roubles a year, or 3% of gdp–less than America spent on the Korean war.

But replacing damaged weapons and spent munitions is not simply a question of money. Russia has churned through military equipment on a vast scale. Estimates of the number of armoured vehicles destroyed during the war, for example, range between 8,000 and 16,000, according to a recent report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (csis), a think-tank. Russia has also lost lots of aircraft, drones and artillery systems.

One solution is to fall back on existing stocks, although many of these are old and in poor repair. Another is to redirect weapons intended for export to the front line. Siemon Wezeman of sipri, a Swedish think-tank, reckons Russia’s arms exports plummeted from $50bn in 2021 to $11bn or less last year. He points out that unusual t-90 tanks—perhaps demonstration models, or units originally destined for Algeria—have been spotted on the battlefield in Ukraine.

Russia is also trying to make more weapons. Dmitri Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s security council, recently said the country would produce 1,500 modern tanks in 2023. Officials have also said they want drones to be manufactured en masse in Russia. Some factories are working around the clock. The government is lending lavishly to arms manufacturers, or ordering banks to do so. In January and February production of “finished metal goods” was 20% higher than the year before, according to official statistics.

The problem is that, to manufacture advanced weapons, it needs access to Western-made, high-end “dual-use” components, from engines to microchips, that are hard to obtain because of Western sanctions. Desperately needed parts can always be diverted to their most urgent use. Thus in February the government temporarily stopped accepting applications for biometric passports to save microchips. High-end washing machines are also being imported in large numbers to be stripped of their chips, presumably for use in guided missiles and other military kit. Ukraine’s military intelligence recently reported that every month Russia manages to make around 30 Kh-101s and 20 Kalibrs, its two main types of guided missile, presumably thanks to such ruses.

But the volumes of advanced weaponry produced is nowhere near what Russia needs to replace its depleting stocks. Ukrainian and Western military officials believe that Russia has used most of its stocks of its most accurate guided missiles. Serial numbers found in the wreckage of spent missiles suggest it is now using new ones, made during the war. Insiders say the army is asking for ten times more tanks than Russia’s factories can produce. A lack of software and technical equipment also seems to be preventing Russia’s production of drones from taking off.

What Russia lacks in quality, however, it may partly compensate for in quantity—by gussying up Soviet-era weapons. It is modernising perhaps 90 old tanks a month by equipping them with new electronics and communication systems. It is refurbishing old missiles that are less accurate but difficult to intercept and repurposing nuclear delivery systems to launch them. It is cannibalising civilian planes to repair fighter jets.

Russia is also getting military supplies from allies. Some artillery shells appear to be arriving from China, via Belarus. Russia is also buying (ostensibly civilian) drones from its eastern neighbour, as well as artillery shells from North Korea. It reportedly also traded 60 Su-35 aircraft with Iran in exchange for several thousand kamikaze drones. In short, the quality of Russian weapons is declining, but it has found ways to avoid running out.

Finding enough people to keep the war effort going is another challenge. Many have been killed in action; many more have emigrated. In the year to December 2022 the number of employed Russians under the age of 35 fell by 1.3m, according to FinExpertiza, an auditor. Shortages of workers are common. In December the central bank said that half of firms surveyed were struggling to find enough staff. There are 2.5 vacancies for every unemployed person, making the Russian labour market twice as tight as America’s. Wages are growing fast. Specialists, such as IT engineers and lawyers, are especially scarce. At a recent meeting of Russia’s entrepreneurs union, the labour shortage was the main topic of conversation.

The labour shortage makes life difficult for military recruiters, too. The army is now sending conscription and mobilisation notices by email, in addition to physical copies, to make it harder for people to pretend they have not seen them. Draftees are not allowed to leave the country. With enough coercion, though, Russia should have no trouble filling its ranks. The country is not about to run out of young men: before the war there were about 17m of them. But more people on the frontline means fewer people in offices and factories. And the more widespread conscription becomes in big cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg, the greater the chance of popular unrest.

The government’s third economic achievement has been to maintain living standards. Last year it spent an extra 3% of gdp to stimulate the economy. Aside from higher spending on the military, support is coming in the form of economic aid to civilian companies: direct handouts to firms, subsidised loans, joint investments and so on. Spending on the budget category that subsumes many of these items, “national economy”, rose by 20% in 2022, to 4.3trn roubles. Between January and mid-March it increased by another 45% compared with the same period last year. Banks are being asked to give indebted firms breathing room. In 2022 business failures fell to a seven-year low.

Last year “social” spending also rose, from 6trn to 7trn roubles (4.5% of gdp). However, says Vladimir Milov, a former deputy minister of energy, the federal government accounts for only part of overall social spending. The pension fund—a nominally independent agency recently renamed the Social Fund—is also doling out cash to retirees, mothers, the disabled and more, as are regional governments. Allowances towards constituencies important to Mr Putin, such as families with more than one child, the poor and the elderly, are growing, notes Maria Snegovaya of csis. Outside Moscow, payments to the families of dead conscripts can be enough to buy a flat.

All this may explain why the war has not affected Russian living standards all that much. Consumer prices did rise by 12% last year, in large part because of a depreciation of the rouble in the spring. Average pay at medium-sized and large companies, which include many state-owned entities, rose marginally last year even after accounting for inflation. The value of people’s savings has fallen only slightly, central-bank statistics suggest. Inflation fell back to 3.5% in March.

Overall, the Russian economy has proved resilient. Real gdp fell by only 2-3% last year—far less than the 10-15% decline that many economists had predicted. A “current activity indicator” compiled by Goldman Sachs, a bank, which correlated closely with official gdp numbers before the war, shows that Russia emerged from recession about a year ago. Most forecasters believe the economy will grow this year (see chart 2).

All this suggests that Mr Putin should be able to maintain the war effort for some time to come. Expanding it, however, is another matter. Some on the right are calling for Mr Putin to spend more than a few percentage points of gdp on the invasion. After all, Russia has embraced total war before—including in 1942 and 1943, when it spent an astonishing 60% of its gdp on the military, according to “Accounting for War”, a book by Mark Harrison published in 1996.

But it is hard to see how Mr Putin could do that while maintaining economic stability and preserving living standards. The first problem would be raising money fast. Not all the sovereign-wealth fund’s assets are liquid. Printing money would spur inflation, causing the rouble to lose value and eroding the living standards the government has worked so hard to preserve. Loading up banks with huge amounts of public debt overnight might have a similar effect, stirring doubts about how soundly the economy was being managed. Tax rises or a big shift in public expenditure towards defence would also eat into personal incomes, And any of these measures would undermine the air of calm, control and stability that Mr Putin is at pains to maintain. “Of course, national defence is the top priority,” he said recently, “but in resolving strategic tasks in this area, we should not repeat the mistakes of the past and should not destroy our own economy.”

It’s unclear that spending vastly more money would achieve the desired results anyway. Russia’s economy has become more centralised, but it is not the planned, command-and-control apparatus of the Soviet times. Converting a budgetary bazooka into weapons of a more conventional sort would thus, at best, take time. The effort would exacerbate the bottlenecks that are already constricting Russia’s military output, in machinery subject to sanctions, for example, and in skilled workers. Much would depend on the continued assistance of China, the Gulf states and other countries through which Russian capital and imports flow–and they might be nervous about abetting a big Russian escalation.

Throwing the kitchen sink at Ukraine therefore looks out of the question. “Considering Russia’s existing capabilities and limitations, it will likely opt for a slower-paced attritional campaign in Ukraine,” asserts the csis report. Mr Putin has succeeded in insulating the Russian economy from the worst effects of war and sanctions–but in a way that makes the war hard to win.

Центъре, аз мисля, че е повече от вярно.

Ще цитирам само 2 изречения от прочетеното:

But Western countries have not cut off Russian banks entirely, as they need to pay for the Russian oil and gas they continue to import. Gazprombank, which processes these payments, remains a member of swift……

The impact of sanctions on Russia’s exports has been bigger–but Western countries always shied away from making them too severe for fear of pushing up energy prices for their own consumers to unbearable levels……

Всичко си има цена.
Един ден Запада ще съжелява за нерешителността си и вече казвам в прав текст - продажността си.

[centara]

Да, за съжаление санкциите хич не са толкова ефективни, колкото на някои им се иска.

[Пресиян]

За никой не е тайна, че Западът не продажен, а комунистите са продажни. Заради наложените на Русия санкции икономиката на Русия буквално ще се срине. Неслучайно толкова много хора искат да емигрират от Русия и да се заселят за постоянно на Запад.

Спроред оценка на експерти среднодневният добив на суров петрол (включително газов кондензат) в Русия през април 2023г. е намалял с около 750 000 барела на ден спрямо февруари 2023г.. Не знам доколко е точна тази оценка, но според мен е ясно, че през април 2023г. среднодневният добив на суров петрол (включително газов кондензат) в Русия наистина е намалял значително спрямо февруари 2023г..
https://www.profinance.ru/news/2023/04/ ... nefti.html

[Dinain]

Да, за съжаление санкциите хич не са толкова ефективни, колкото на някои им се иска.

Напълно изпускате фактора "време" от сметките си. Европейското ограничене от $60 за барел кога беше прието, декември 2022 г. И май влезе в сила януари 2023 г. Това е преди 3 месеца, и имаше незабавен ефект. Газът и нефтът на Русия за Q1 2023 са -46%. Износът на Газпром за 2023 г. се очаква да е на половина в сравнение с 2021 г. А сега вече Г7 обсъждат тотално търговско ембарго на Русия.

Ами бъдете реалисти, като до вчера си внасял 40% от газа си от Русия, няма как за един ден да го спреш. Освен ако не целиш да се самоубиеш/да ти падне правителството... Има решителност, но има и здрав разум, и къде ти "продажност". "...fear of pushing up energy prices for their own consumers to unbearable levels"

Ами да, не са изключили Газпром от суифт все още, защото Европа все още внася 5% от газа си от Русия и ще продължава да го внася някъде до края на 2023 г. Но преди една година внасяше 40% и това е огромен напредък - нещо градено 40 години, рухна за една.

И мен ми се искаше някой да подпише документ през март 2022 г. и в Москва да им спре тока, ама няма такова магическо средство.

...

Последствията от СВО и масовата емиграция от Русия: най-високия недостиг на кадри на трудовия пазар откакто се води статистика (1998 г.).

Да мобилизират още 300-400К, ще се подобри...

Работник двадцатипятилетия

Нехватка кадров оценена на рекордном уровне
В первом квартале этого года российские предприятия зафиксировали рекордную с момента начала наблюдений (1998 год) нехватку кадров, следует из опроса ЦБ. С наибольшими проблемами по части обеспеченности работниками столкнулись обрабатывающие производства, компании сфер водоснабжения, хранения и транспортировки. Менее других на нехватку кадров жалуются представители торговли и сферы услуг.

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5952421

[Пресиян]

Според оценки от Централната банка на Русия стойността на износа на стоки от Русия през първото тримесечие на 2023г. е намаляла с около
53 700 000 000 щатски долара спрямо първото тримесечие на 2022г., а този спад в проценти е около 34,8 %.
Според оценки на Централната банка на Русия стойността на износа на услуги от Русия през първото тримесечие на 2023г. е намаляла с около
4 700 000 000 щатски долара спрямо първото тримесечие на 2022г., а този спад в проценти е около 33,8 %.
Според оценки на Централната банка на Русия дефицитът в търговията с услуги на Русия през първото тримесечие на 2023г. се е увеличил с около 1 300 000 000 щатски долара спрямо първото тримесечие на 2022г., а това увеличение е около 36,1 %.
https://www.cbr.ru

[centara]

Ами бъдете реалисти, като до вчера си внасял 40% от газа си от Русия, няма как за един ден да го спреш. Освен ако не целиш да се самоубиеш/да ти падне правителството... Има решителност, но има и здрав разум, и къде ти "продажност". "...fear of pushing up energy prices for their own consumers to unbearable levels"

Нямах предвид това. Налагането на санкции е лесно, но следенето за тяхното изпълнение изобщо не е. Нито пък е евтино. И сега се започна една игра на котка и мишка с отваряне и затваряне на вратички за заобикаляне на санкциите. Ако ще е необходимо време, вместо да се следи кой не спазва санкциите, много по-ефективно е да се даде съвременно въоръжение на Украйна - F-16, Tornado, А-10, ATACMS, Cobra, Leopard.

[plamenhk]

Въпросът със санкциите е сложен и върху него оказват влияние много фактори (военни, политически, икономически, обществени и пр.)

Главната цел е ограничаване на финансирането на РФ чрез намаляване на руският експорт във определени сфери. Силата на ограниченията зависи от отражението което дават тези санкции върху западната икономика.

Това ограничение на финансирането на РФ се постига не само пряко, но и по други различни начини - например чрез разрешаването на внос на нестратегически стоки от страна на РФ за които тя ИЗРАЗХОДВА част от спестяванията си или чрез очкваната забрана на транзит на стоки през територията на РФ. В противен случай РФ ще увеличи валутните си спестяванията.

Втората паралелна цел е ограничаване на достъпа на стратегически стоки/оборудване/компоненти и пр до РФ.
Забраната на транзит на стратегически стоки/оборудване/компоненти и пр през РФ до други главно граничещи страни (Казахстан, Армения, Грузия и др) не само ще ограничи приходите от транзита, но ще прекъсне и един от пътищата за придобиване на такива стоки (стратегическите транзитни стоки не стигат до получателя си а остават в РФ).

Санкциите работят и примката бавно се затяга. Целта е постепенно да се обезкърви руската икономика и финанси а обществото и бизнес елита да почуства това. Бързата военна победа на Украйна само ще разпали реваншизма при относително запазване на настроенията на зомбираното общество и потенциала на икономиката и финансите.

Постепенното унищожаване на рашистката армия не може да се скрие вече от пропагандата и дава пряко и косвено негативно отражение в обществото.